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The concept of paying employees what they ar* "worth" is
a concept that goes back to the very first employee. Since
then, compensation for services has been analyzed from every
angle by everyone from employers to economists. Determining
the amount cf compensation can be difficult. Tonventional
employers (such as manufacturers and serir ice-related
producers) usually have the luxury of being able to calcu-
late what a worker contributes to the firm. Tais is known
as value of the marginal product, or VMP. VMP is egual to
the marginal product of the worker, MP, multiplied by the
cost (or price P) of the worker. The textbook equation
VMP = MP x P
is fairly straightforward, and in a profit-oriented busi-
ness, the productivity of most production woricers can be
fairly well estimated. The application of himan capital
theory to the firm is fairly clear cut, for aost of the
variables share the common denominator of monetary units
(dollars) .
The problem of determining the correct amount of compen-
sation for members of a military organization poses a much
more difficult and complicated problem, and narrowing this
down to a dollar figure is not an easy task. The military
system does not have the luxury of being able to calculate
the value of each member's contribution into dollars, for
the end product of the military organization is readiness.
Most military occupational specialties (MOS's), or ratings,
do not have a corresponding civilian counterpart, and
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therefore the final product (readiness) cannot ba translated
into dollars using this method of comparison. Sd me military
occupational specialties/ratings do closely correspond with
certain civilian occupations, but even so, the military
responsibilities and duties unique to the person in the
service usually do not correspond to those in the civilian
sector, and thus we are back to the classic problem of
trying to compare "apples with oranges."
The military system works with an implicitly defined
two-dimensional workforce. .. the structure consists of both
leadership/ experience (paygrades E- 1 to O-10) aid technical
expertise (pilot, technician, etc.) . In the past, the inte-
gration of these two dimensions was not necessarily crit-
ical. The paygrade and its leadership responsibilities
almost always had precedence over the serviceman's technical
capabilities and expertise. As the complexity of the mili-
tary service increased and the competition for technicians
with the private sector heightened, a more econon ic approach
needed to be taken to ensure that leadership as well as
technical requirements were met.
B. FORCE COMPETENCY... (WHO)
Findirg an opponent among our nation's lawmi kers to the
idea of maintaining a military force that was competent to
do the job would be difficult. When the caveat d£ achieving
this force through the allocation of competing scarce
resources is added, however, the definition of "competent"
becomes negotiable and the staunch support for the original
idea starts to waver. The concern for obtaining "more bang
for the buck" is the focal point of the competition for
dollars, so our "competent force" must be efficient if it is
to be funded. Likewise, each dollar spent on our military
"employees" must also reflect that he is effective and can
carry out his mission successfully.
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The problems that we have discussed thus fa: (compensa-
tion being linked to performance, integration of leadership
and technical performance, efficiency and effectiveness of
military manpower dollars, and how these relate to the final
structure and capability of the force), are factors that
cause military manpower planners to focus their ittention on
the concept of force competency. In December of: 1982, the
O.S. Army Soldier Support Center was tasked to develop and
implement a performance-based military occupational
specialty structure that based compensation on both leader-
ship competence and technical competence [Eef. 1 ]• It is
this idea. . .performance-ba sed (two-dimensional) manage-
ment-. .that is the primary topic of this thesis. This
author intends to closely examine the concept and its rami-
fications and then to investigate the applicability to the
United States Navy.
C. USEFULNESS (WHY)
There are many advantages in using this approach that
are reasonably evident. Besides those already discussed,
such a system could potentially improve the competency of
the force, establish standards (criteria) that would have to
be met before giving increases in compensation (such as
bonuses) , modify the present "up-or-out" strategy resulting
in a more senior career force, reduce accession and training
costs (due to better retention), cause a moce accurate
determination of manpower requirements (including quality as
well as quantity), and a host of other advantagss that will
be discussed in the thesis.
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D. CURRENT PROGRAM STATUS., .. (HOW)
The U.S. Army's pilot program on perfo: mance- based
competency is well underway. Research has beea conducted,
milestones and responsibilities have been established, and
feasibility models have been constructed. One of the most
significant accomplishments thus far has been t he creation
of the Performance Based Compensation Analysis Model, devel-
oped by Robert A. Butler and Oliver L. Frankel of The
Assessment Group, a private contractor in Saata Monica,
California [Ref. 2]. This model predicts for:: e structure
and size changes based on pay and promotion rules of a two-
dimensional (leadership/technical) system. It L s a steady-
state model that describes costs and force strictures with
the ability to change several parameters to predict possible
outcomes. Steady-state is an appropriate method for evalua-
tion, for it provides the user with an eventual, outcome of
the system that reflects long range results. It will be
described in detail, and application to U.S. Navy force
structure will also be discussed.
E. STRUCTURE OF THESIS
This introduction (CHAP TER ONE) is meant to encapsulate
and preview material to be covered in detail li ter in the
thesis. CHAPTER TWO deals with the description and the
basic structure of a proposed Per formance-Basei Management
System (PBMS) and the previously mentioned Performance-Based
Compensation Analysis Model (PBCAM)
.
CHAPTER TH REE will
analyze the system and discuss some of the current problems
as well as the status of the proposed U.S. Army program.
CHAPTER FOUR will examine what progress has already been
made and try to examine the U.S. Navy applicatioi
.
13
Time and resources have not permitted the use of U.S.
Navy data to project force levels and costs, so therefore
the author intends to outline a "recipe" that will direct
the steps to be taken to accomplish an in-depth analysis of
the concept at a future time. CHAPTER FIVE looks at modifi-
cations to the system (i.e. bonuses vs. professional pay)
and future prospects and directions that the system may
take. CHAPTER SIX (CONCLUSIONS) briefly sun marizes the
thesis and presents the author's recommendations. Finally,
supporting references and appendices can be founi at the end
of the thesis.
F. PURPOSE OF THESIS
The thesis has two primary objectives:
1) Presentation of the material in an understand-
able form.
2) Analysis of performance-based managenent in
the USN.
The first objective is of greatest concern to the author,
for the material presented has reasonable merit and poten-
tial if it can be conveyed to policymakers. Tie author is
committed to writing this thesis in an understandable, non-
technical format. Anacronyms have been avoided when
possible, and the text is simplified, hopefully helping to
meet the first objective. The second objective is contained
in the thesis, which the reader will hopefully enjoy and
find of interest.
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II. THE CONCEPT OP TWO DIMENSIONAL PERFOBMAN: E-BASED
MANAGEMENT
A. OVERVIEW
Article I Section VIII of the United States Constitution
authorizes tha U.S. Congress the following powers:
"The congress shall have the power to
... provide for the common defence and general, welfare
of the United States
;
....To raise and support armies...;
....To provide and maintain a navy;
....To make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces;
....To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the militia, and for governing such part Df them as
may be employed in the service of the United States..."
[Ref. 3 J
Since the United States of America was astablished,
these responsibilities have been carried out by d ur nation's
lawmakers. The structure and size of our armed forces have
changed dramatically since the time of the founding fathers,
but the annual task of reviewing and determining the compo-
sition and budget of our nation's military forces continues.
B. MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
A good way to acguire an overall view of cue rent trends
in the size, structure, and mission of the Department of
Defense is to read the Annual Report to the Coa_g,ress given
by the Secretary of Defense each fiscal year [Ref- 4]. In
reading the report, there is an overall statement of purpose
and strategy which is used as a basis for budgeting
resources. Two particular sections stand out in the FY 1984
report:
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"The President's FY 1984 defense budget reflects our
continued commitment to maintaining and enhancing the
current operating forces of the military ani ensuring
this Nation's future security. It has been developed
based on an honest and realistic reassessment of our
existing and long-term military capabilities in the face
of a growing threat. The costs are stated cleirly. It
is economically productive and provides for a controlled
growth rate.... The achievement and maintenance of
improved levels of readiness and sustain ability continue
to receive a high priority. Force modernization and
expansion programs are planned to meet the ever present
and growing Soviet challenge." [ Ref . 4]
The next quotation helps to demonstrate the portion of
the budget that our defense manpower planners a: e concerned
with
:
"Operating costs represent about 52% of the 3 oD budget
in FY 1984. This category includes our payments to
military and civilian personnel and military retirees as
well as allocations for maintenance and repair of equip-
ment and for utilities, medical costs, training, petro-
leum and lubricants, and spare parts." [Ref. *
j
The planning, programming, and budgeting tasks act as a
method for ultimate formulation of a defense budget
reflecting desired force levels. This budget is eventually
submitted to Congress for consideration, which authorizes
and finally appropriates the funds necessary for the the DoD
to inplement its programs.
Once the requirements for force levels have been estab-
lished, authorized, and funded, the next difficult phase
begins. The individual services in the Department of
Defense are charged with recruiting young men and women from
the civil sector, indoctrinating and training them, and then
finally distributing them in appropriate qjantity and
quality. This entire process is to be accomplished at
minimum cost, and once the personnel are in place, the next
task is to maintain them in adequate numbers an d skill so
that the nation is ready to defend itself against any threat
and to carry out its ever changing national policies.
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There is very little that is static in ti is manpower
system. The size and composition of the force is continu-
ally changing. Increasing technological denial d includes
factors such as an increased number of data systems,
increased (and more complex) maintenance for sophisticated
hardware, and more complex manned (as well as robotic)
systems that require increased operator skill. Manning this
force with strictly the correct numbers of people is not
adequate..
.
quality is an equal counterpart.
To achieve a force with the correct quantity/ quality mix
(in our constrained system of a democratic republic that
utilizes an all- volunteer force), a key required ingredient
for success is compensation . There are three basic reasons




Each one of these areas has both quantity i nd quality
requirements that must be satisfied. Therefore, in order to
meet force requirements, we must attract the ser/ice person,
pay him enough to stay on the job, and if level of perform-
ance is important, we must pay slightly more (due to
training, retention in the military sector, and maintenance
of proficiency). This does not vary greatly from the civil
sector, but there are some unique demands that are placed on
service personnel that are not found in the civil sector.
The following figure demonstrates some policy tradeoffs:
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POLICY VARIABLES ENVIRONMENTAL FIXED VARIABLES
Recruiting Economy End strei gths
Selection Demographics Budget
Training Legal constraints Force requirements
Evaluation
Compensation
Figure 2.1 Relationships of Policy Variables to Other
Factors.
Policy can be changed and modified in orler to meet
overall reguirements, and compensation is one of the vari-
ables that is most often adjusted to meet reguirements. In
our military system of the 1980's, the services are still
having difficulty in successfully linking perf 3 rmance with
compensation.
This is a vital link in satisfying military manpower
reguirements that are performance related, and a link that
would be much more evident and strengthened with the imple-
mentation of a performance- based management system.
C. MILITARY ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
The present military structure of the United States
Armed Forces exhibits a relatively traditional system that
has been added to and modified to meet changing reguire-
ments. Disregarding the unique characteristics of each
individual service component, one sees several basic divi-
sions. The most obvious is the enlisted compoient and the
officer component, resembling labor and management in the
civil sector. Entry into each sector is largely dependent
on the amount of education of the entrant. PrDmotion from
the lower hierarchy to the upper hierarchy is limited, and
entry from the civil sector into the military (lateral
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entry), with a few exceptions, originates at tie bottom of
each respective hierarchy.
Another division in the system is that of: technical
skills and general skills. There are special communities,
corps, and specialties where there is differentiated compen-
sation for the same paygrade. There is nothing uniform
about people in uniform. .. the equation of an E-4 being
equivalent to another E-4 is rarely true. For example, an
E-4 avionics technician in a flying status with several
dependents living in a high cost area will be aaking thou-
sands of dollars more per year than a single E-4 boatswain's
mate that lives on board a ship (due to differences in
compensation based on years of service, dependents,
training, specialty skills, promotion rates, etc. )
.
There are dozens of personnel/human resourca management
texts that deal with different models and theories of the
basic problem of matching the indi.Z.icluji! with the job. Each
text will usually mention external influencss such as
existing laws and regulations, characteristics of the
economy, social environment, the manpower pool, and "other
external factors (these will be covered throughout the
thesis). Each text will then focus on the matching of indi-
viduals to jobs [Bef- 5]- The degree or measurement to
which this match is successful is measurable by factors like
attraction, performance, retention, attendance, satisfac-
tion, and other criteria. Support activities performed to
accomplish this person-to job match include meisurement of
employee ability (testing), job analysis, training, rewards
and motivation of employees, measurement of performance on
the job, and personnel planning. Functional activities
include recruiting, testing, selection, training, career
management, and employee development. Other ke/ functional
activities include compensation, work environment, and areas
relating to non-pecuniary aspects of the job. This basic
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description is applicable to both civil aid military
sectors.
As a recruit enters a military or civilian system, he
encounters almost all of the processes mentioned in the
preceding paragraph to some degree. He is recruited,
tested, selected, and placed in a training program that
teaches the requirements of a specific job. During his
tenure, he is motivated, compensated, deveL oped, and
promoted in accordance with a master personnel plan. His
success is constantly measured through the previously
mentioned criteria (performance evaluation, jjb satisfac-
tion, attendance, etc.) until his ultimate separation or
retirement.
There are organizational characteristics that are
peculiar tc our present military system that are worthy of
mention here. Military employees are bound by a contract
(federally enforced). They are competing in an up-or-out
system where lack of advancement results in discharge, thus
being somewhat contrary to the "peter principle, " where one
reaches a level higher than their capability [Ref- 6]. The
military system is basically an internal labor market, where
desirable characteristics developed by training and experi-
ence are not usually obtainable from other soirees. The
military must staff all of its more senior billets inter-
nally. The military employer also invests a significant
amount of money into human capital-intensive training. The
job consists of many military as well as technical aspects,
and there is a different set of laws and regulations
governing employment. Promotions and job requirements are
governed by an (enlisted) personnel management system
(EPMS) . Although some of these characteristics can be found
in certain civilian occupations, all are unique to military
service. There are other unique aspects of military life
that have not been mentioned, such as risk, quality of life,
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and working environment, but what has been mentioned is
adequate for a basic description of the military system and
its environment.
D. CIVILIAN ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
The system of matching people to jobs ii the civil
sector has already been discussed. There are, however,
significant social, economic, and demographic factors that
directly affect the personnel process in today's society.
1 . Changing Manpower S up_p_ly_
Due to the post World War II "baby boon" the U.S.
male population average age is increasing. Lower birth
rates following the "baby boom" have resulted in a declining
cohort of 18 year old males £Ref. 7].
2 • High-techno logy
The shift to higher technology weapons systems has
created a need for employees with adequate education, and
competition between the military and civil sectDr to accede
these quality individuals has stiffened. The military
demand for these individuals has increased due to higher
organizational and equipment requirements.
3 . Growth
The post-recession economy of 1984 has lDwered unem-
ployment and has caused concern that the recruiting market
will soon be unable tc supply the military at reg.uired force
levels. Additional expansion of the military (increased
end-strengths and growth) has exacerbated the problem
[Ref. 8].
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**• Attitude towards Military
Although the attitudes of youth towarl s military
service have been steadily improving, certain aspects of
military life (risk, uncertainty of benefits, commitment)
still are unappealing to many [Ref. 9].
A summary of the civilian and military environment
as well as tha responsibilities of the Departmen: of Defense
has just been presented. Although this information may not
seem pertinent and may appear to be all-inclusive, each
factor presented has some bearing upon the revision of the
present system and reflects the inter dependencies of dynamic
personnel systems. Failure to consider these factors could
have detrimental results. The next major section gets to
the heart of the matter... a description of Performance Based
Management.
E. PERFORMANCE BASED MANAGEMENT
1 . Description
The objective of performance-based mam gement for
the military is to man the force "...through attainment of a
competency based, quality force with a higher career
content. .. The new approach would provide two dimensions to
success: leadership potential and technical competence..."
[Hef. 1] A key ingredient is the tie between compensation
and performance. For levels of increased techaical compe-
tence (or leadership potential) , increased compensation
would be awarded. This compensation was originally intended
to be awarded in the form of professional paf , but the
possibility of integrating the current system of bonuses
should not be ruled out.
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A diagram of the proposed system can oe found in
figure 2.2 (following page) . The vertical axis denotes the
amount of leadership skill of the service member and corre-
sponds tc current enlisted paygrades. The horizontal axis
represents the degree of technical proficiency (in seme
occupational specialty), with movement to the right indi-
cating increased technical proficiency. Any upward or
rightward horizontal movement would result ia increased
compensation. Leadership progression would be represented
by upward movement, and technical progression ay rightward
horizontal movement. The concept of vectoring means the
degree and direction that a person would move during his
career. . .hopefully upward and to the right. Leidership and
technical progression would be certified using special
testing and other criteria.
F. RESTRICTIONS AND GROUND ROLES
Development of the performance based management system
was primarily accomplished by the U.S. Army Soldier Support
Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, in 193 2. It was
tasked by the 0. S. Army Training and Doctrine command under
the cognizance of U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel to develop a concept that would identity, develop,
execute, and evaluate a pilot program that would demonstrate
the feasibility of a system that recognized competence in
two dimensions. There were several ground rules and
restrictions placed on the designers. The system had to
conform to existing legal authority; it was to include
combat arms, combat support, and combat service forces; it
was to consider the use of competency level technical
certification as a performance based criteria foe promotion;
it was to also consider legislative changes that would be











































































































































Figure 2-2 Soldier Success Paths.
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Various working groups were briefed on tie idea and
solicited for input, and their consideration s will be
mentioned in the next chapter. Some of the kef considera-
tions included cost-benefit analysis, training rssources and
certification standards, development of choice (decision)
points where a soldier could track either vertically or
horizontally, ths justification of current force structure,
and examination of the concept's harmony with established
goals.
The original study was based on fivs Military
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Additionally, the system had to be appeaLing to the
force. It was supposed to be "evolutionary" instead of
"revolutionary." It was not supposed to replace the
Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) , but only to
modify it. Senior enlisted (as well as senior officers)
would have to accept the system, so it couldn't be too
radical. Middle management would have to support it, and it
had to be simple enough to explain and manage.
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G, POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF PBMS
The following is a brief list of key reasons and expla-
nations why the two dimensional performance-based system
could be advantageous:
C ) • Evolutionary, not revolutionary. It is
not uprooting the existing system, but merely fine-tuning
it.
(2) . Definition of ra quirem ents .
Implementation of the system will force the users, to specify
exactly what quantity/quality manpower is required. It is
customer oriented.
(3). Up -or-in. Good technicians that may have
low leadership potential would not be forced out. This
manpower saving could potentially result in dollar savings.
For example, a technician retiring after 30 years of service
as an E-5 might not be uncommon.
(4). Compensation flexi bility. Compensation
could be paid as monthly professional pay, ana ual profes-
sional pay, a selective reenlistment bonus, or pi id in other
increments which were based on £erfocmance, competency, and
£ro f i cienc^
.
(5). Re turn on human capital. Technicians that
are retained would contribute resources in retirn for the
dollars spent on training them, thus demonstrating the effi-
ciency principle of compensation.
(6). Lower accessions. Higher retention of
trained personnel could result in fewer personnel to be
trained at the front end of the training pipeline. This
would be especially significant in a booming ecDnomy with a
declining cohort. This would also result in reduced
recruiting costs and a smaller recruiting force.
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(7) . A ppeal to new retirement systen . Current
dissatisfaction over a young and inexperience} force and
early retirement could be eased by using PBMS, for a more
career-oriented force would result. Techniciais might be
more willing to remain for thirty years.
(8) . Less tra ining money wasted 01 att rites.
With a lower number of accessions, less money woj Id be spent
on those personnel that eventually attrite.
(9) . Easier lateral entry.. Being mire economi-
cally in harmony with the civil sector and having specific
qualification requirements would greatly reduce the diffi-
culties in acquiring alrea dy- trained techniciais from the
civil sector.
(10). Scientific advancement proc| ss. PEMS
could reduce the uncertainty of promotion, for requirements
would be more clearly defined. Morale would improve because
non- selectees would know exactly why they weren't promoted.
(11) . Objective measures of performance.
Quantifiable performance, such as knowledge level, accuracy,
proficiency, and other skills measured by practical,
hands-on testing.
(12) . Reward tied to desired a erf or mance .
Rather than throwing a broad blanket of money to a large
group hoping to reward only a deserving percentage of the
group, payment would be made only to those deserving. We
would not be "rewarding A and hoping for B," which is a
partial problem of the selective reenlistment boa us program.
(13). Optimization of talent^money_. Using the
proper programming, manpower dollars spent on taLent will be
closer to a point of cptimality, again promoting efficiency
and better return on investment.
(14) . Lateral m obi lity. Instead of graduating a
technician out of his job into a supervisory pDsition, he
can opt for continuing his technical career without economic
punishment.
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(15). Ad justable EQlicy. 3.§.tes. Promotion
requirements, decision flow points, and other policies can
be adjusted tD fit requirements.
(16). No over crowded specialties. Policy
adjustments can tailor the personnel to the nesd. Better
morale due to better promotional and financial ra wards.
(17). Ac cess ion benefit. A well-defined system
with good compensation will attract applicants to military
service. No need to depend on politically unstaD le benefits
(GI Bill, commissaries, retirement) to draw people into the
service.
(18). Mo rale. Reward for good performance and
lack of it for poor performance will definitely boost
morale.
(19). Im proved testing. Increased emphasis on
tests (including hands-on, non-paper- and-pencil tests) could
result in better validity and reliability in testing.
(20). Manpower planning . Computers in a manage-
ment information system using PBMS will allow better
manpower planning. Specific job requirements and character-
istics will make integration of personnel with hardware
easier.
H. POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF PBMS
Performance based management is not without potential
disadvantages:
C)- Status-quo is easier. Thera is always
reluctance to change, and some sub-groups of the present
force may demonstrate significant reluctance.
(2) . Unequal p_ay_. Paying more for technicians
might be perceived as being unfair. The importaice of lead-
ership skill will appear to be de-emphasized, aid there may
be some hostility between members of the same leader level
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due to a large disparity in pay between technicians and
non-technicians (for example, two E-7's from different
communities)
.
(3) • Po tential cost . The system wiL 1 initially
cost more due to implementation, some increased compensa-
tion, and testing (as well as other costs). During a period
of fiscal restraint and large deficits, implementing such a
system could be difficult.
C*) • Ei^is* Although computer nodels and
analysts appear to be correct, what if they ars not? The
military manpower system is delicate and the consequences of
modifying a successful system could be dangerous. Perhaps
if it isn*t "broken" it shouldn't be "fixed".
(5) . Testing costs. Significant work (and
cost) lies in the development of proficiency tz sts and job
analysis.
(6). In crea sed retirement costs. A career
force will result in a larger retired population. With more
personnel under the retirement system, PBMS could appear an
unattractive alternative.
(7). Dead wood. An older force couL d result in
lower productivity and less promotional opportunity.
(8). M e asur ing performance. Can performance
really be measured? Is it quantifiable?
(9). Op timization, Regulating poli: y to afford
the best mix of costs/talent could prove to be a nightmare.
Can the optimization problem be mathematically SDlved?
(10). Confus ing system. The education of two
million service members concerning a complex new system (and
winning their approval) is a large obstacle.
(11). Consta nt policy adjustment. Adjusting
policy constantly to fit requirements may cause lissatisf ac-
tion and demonstrate inconsistency.
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These are the potential disad/ antages and
advantages of incorporating a two-dimensional performance
based nanagement system into the U.S. military forces. The
next chapter will discuss the U.S. Army's implementation
status of PBMS thus far and talk about some of the problems
already discussed.
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III. IJPLEMEHTATIQN OF THE PBMS CONCEPT
Performance based management in the armed forces is not
just a theory... the ground work for program implementation
is currently being performed. There are several major
hurdles to overcome before the system is fully implemented,
and this chapter hopes to discuss program implementation as
veil as the problems that are faced. Besides milestone
plans and funding considerations, computer models that lie
at the heart of the program will be discussed (this includes




In the short life of PBMS thus far, it has done a lot of
travelling and been subject to much scrutiny. Proponents of
the program have explained the concept to all levels of Army
management and have listened to recommendations and poten-
tial pitfalls, making the necessary modifications. The
evolutionary process towards better force management
continues, and presently there is high interest by Congress
and the executive branch (largely driven by fiscal
constraints) in achieving the same goals thi t the PBMS
program will hopefully achieve. The environment, therefore,
is providing a climate that will aid in the success of PBMS.
Thus far, all indications show that the PBMS pilot program
in the Army will become a reality.
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1. U.S. Arnry Milestones
The original program milestones for ths Army were
identified into four phases (and can also be found in
Appendix C) :
PHASE I FY 1983 Pilot program resojrcing and
development
PHASE II FY 1984-87 Pilot program execi tion and
evaluation
PHASE III FY 1984-87 Analysis and development for
Army-wide implementation
PHASE IV FY 1988-90 Prioritized Army-wi.de
implementation
Figure 3.1 U.S. Army PBMS Milestones,
2 . Fun din
g
When trying to implement any new program, funding is
usually one of the first and foremost issues. The amount of
expense for research/ development, and major change to a
system such as PBMS is incredible (although cost savings
could very well justify the expense). Prior to February of
1984, approximately $150,000 had already be=n spent on
program development, and an additional two-million dollars
may conceivably be programmed prior to FY 1988 [Ref. 10].
This two-million dollar program will accrue significantly
higher costs upon full-scale implementation (and at this
point we're talking about REAL money). Although these costs
may very well be justified, all of the services should
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understand the start-up costs of the system. The ether
services should be watching the program carefully, for many
of the pitfalls can be identified from the Army's ground-
work. Pilot program implementation, however, is probably
the only accurate method of establishing realistic windows
of cost. Prior and expected PBMS funding levels can be
found in Appendix E.
3 • Development
Development of milestones and a piLot program
appears to have been guite thorough. Levels of "profes-
sional pay" have been arbitrarily set at 50 dollirs for each
technical class level. This amount was chosen because there
is current legislation that authorizes the use of profes-
sional pay at that level, and other dollar figures would
reguire a change in legislation. Other alternative pay
increments are conceivable (based perhaps on labor elastici-
ties) and may be used after the program has been permanently
established.
The occupational specialties (MOS*s) thi t have been
chosen in the pilot program reflect a wide range and repre-
sent different categories. The pilot program includes
members of operational and support units, which is signifi-
cant due to the size of support units relative to the total
force.
The pilot program intends to involve approximately
6200 soldiers that will participate over a three-year period
£Ref - 1 ]. Probability for program success appears high,
primarily due to the potential advantages discussed in the
last chapter. The alternative (recruiting more and higher-
quality recruits from a decreasing cohort) alsj adds some
thrust tc PBMS program success.
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The idea of protecting the participants involved in
the pilot program has received much consideration. Career
potential for participants must remain intact regardless of
program success, and the Army is developing a "Stop Loss"
management system to fulfill this requirement. It will be
in place prior to system implementation and wiL 1 delineate
procedures to protect pay and compensation, promotion eligi-
bility, school selection, and will also state procedures for
reintegraticn into the current system.
Besides protection, PBMS pilot programs also will
include common rules and criteria that will show the partic-
ipating chain of command how to effectively rua the pilot
program in their units and decide who will receive compe-
tency pay. An exhaustive list of responsibilities and
cognizant individuals has also been developed; the method
used for this listing was the functional life-cy- le model of
the Army.
Another consideration for pilot program implementa-
tion was the existing legal authority to implenent such a
program. Various titles of the U.S. Code deal specifically
with pay grade/rank, pro-pay, bonuses, career length, rank
structure, compensation, and other issues.
A systems approach to PBMS has also resulted in
analysis of how PBMS relates and integrates to ei vironmental
changes, Army goals, force modernization, training plan,
measures of performance and merit, research, long range and
mission planning, and a host of other important areas, to
ensure a consistent master strategy-
One of the most significant and least quantifiable
issues of PBMS implementation is the role and identity of
the soldier and his perception of military custon and tradi-
tion. As technical specialization has become a reality of
our military forces, its integration has not been very
successful. A clash between technical and leadership roles
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has usually been evidenced, and this issue of enListed force
identity must be confronted, researched, and solved with
heavy invclvenent of the NCO community.
** • Current St at us
The concept has been conceived, implementation has
been partially funded, and a pilot program has been planned
to make PBKS a reality for the Army. Several different
commands hold attitudes ranging from extremely positive to
somewhat negative. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) supports the Army in the evaluation of the PBMS
concept. The idea of a more senior force and training cost
savings is in basic agreement with the President's Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control (PPSSCC, or Grace Commission)
.
The other services have a wait-and-see attitude for the most
part. The Army DCSPER (Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel)
recommends program continuation with a delay in program
milestones and a few other structure-related changes, as
well as having a soldier survey completed and analyzed by
the summer of 19 84. Finally, additional funding for FY 1984
has been approved and the program is healthy.
The next section of this chapter will discuss th
finer points of the Performance Based Compensation Analysis
Model (PBCAM) which has provided much of the basis for
program analysis and evaluation.
B. PBCAM
Before development passed the conceptual stage, an
economic model was deemed necessary to determine whether
PBMS was even remotely feasible. The Performance Base d
Compen sation Analysis Mode l, developed under contract by The
Assessment Group of Santa Monica, California, rfas designed




1 . DescrijD t ion
The PBCAM model was designed to predict force struc-
ture and size changes resulting from a user -det er mined set
of pay and promotion rules. Although not yet in its final
stage, the complete model will be capable of handling a
larger scope of issues in a more sophisticated fashion and
will give transition (year by year) results instead of
steady-state (long-run) results. The full model will
contain a Career Planning Model (CPM) , a PBCAM model
containig both transition and steady-state options, and
interface with other manpower models, such as AMORE (AMORE,
or Analysis of Military OR ganizational Effectiveness, is a
model that simulates a random attrition of combat personnel
and then attempts to measure the degradation of capability)
.
There are two points that are important to make
concerning the use of computers- There is no magic involved
when using a computer. .. it is merely a combination of
on-or-off circuits that allows the user to use the computer
as a guick and sophisticated scratchpad. Manpower manage-
ment has evolved to the point where computer assisted
management is a necessity for the numbers an d types of
calculations involved.
The second point involving computers is that the
computer is only capable of performing calculations based on
a program that has been designed by a human. Any final
output is based upon assumptions and algorithms that may or
may not be correct.
a. Career Planning Model
The Career Planning Model (CPM) , though not yet
fully integrated, is based on the theory of human capital.
Human capital theory treats the training of human beings as
an investment that will reap future returns in productivity.
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The more productive (or the longer period of tima ) a soldier
is at work, the higher the success of the investment. Human
capital investment theory also deals with who actually pays
for the training (employer or employee) and the value of
the training. Although the present models do not incorpo-
rate these ideas, models of the future could possibly
include them.
A second concept that is fundamental to these
manpower models is the concept of £resent value. In order
to compare the costs to the benefits of different invest-
ments that are made at different times, a common denominator
that puts these costs and returns on the sama scale for
comparison is net present value. Net present value is based
on the idea that (in most cases) an amount of money that is
lent today Is worth more than the exact same amount of money
lent next year. Due to factors such as uncertainty and
inflation, the lender must be compensated for waiting to get
his money back. The proportion of the initial amount of
money lent that is required each year to compensate the
lender for waiting is known as the annual discount rate.
The formula:
periods
Repayment = Principal x ( 1 + Discount rate)
or
t
R = PV (1 + d)
is a means of calculating PV (present value), i hich allows
us to compare costs with returns. Through manipulation of
the basic formula, various rates of return and streams of
costs/payments can also be calculated.
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The present value formula is the foi ndation for
calculating and then comparing different costs and returns
over the career of a soldier. As an example, the tradeoff
between increased length (cost) of training and productivity
can be compared using present values for different mixes.
As mentioned earlier, a soldier's productivity
is not an easily quantifiable value. This fact causes us to
use assumptions about returns on the investment of human
capital. One basic assumption that is used by the model is
that all labor costs incurred by the service (compensation,
training costs, etc.) reflect the productivity of labor, or
the marginal value product. This assumption (perhaps incor-
rect) implies that the soldier is paid exactly for his
productivity (the government would not pay him n ore than he
was worth and the soldier would not want to work for less
than what he was worth). As a result of a study done by The
Assessment Group in 1982 the assumption is alsD made that
the disccunt rate, or rate of return to investment, is ten
percent for a soldier. With these assumptions, plus a base-
line population and cost data set, one can calculate the
present value of cost and return streams associated with a
specific type of investment (like training far an MOS) .
Incorporating the use of probabilities and expected return,
a curve consisting of optimal combinations can be estab-
lished. When reenlistment bonuses and retiremeit costs are
added, even further accuracy is the result. The type of
information that can be derived from a model sich as this
includes optimal timing for promotion flow points associated
with training, required pay increase points and amounts for
maximized retention, and eligibility cut-off points for
those in a slowed promotion cycle.
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b. AMORE
The AMORE (Analysis of Military OR; anizational
Effectiveness) nodel is a model used by the Department of
Defense for determining the operational capability of a unit
due to reduced manning (caused either by lack of available
manpower or casualties) . The full PBCAM model will inter-
face directly with AMORE, which will allow diract measure-
ment (via simulation) of the readiness impact associated
with reduced manning due to PBMS. Being able to induce
shortages in specific MOS skills can ultimately result in
dollar values of relative contributions to readiness, and
thus help prioritize funding for training.
2. Construction of PBCAM
The purpose of the Performance Based Compensation
Analysis Model is to make comparisons of inventories
resulting from long term, or steady state application of
PBMS as opposed to the current Enlisted Personnel Management
System (EPMS). The comparisons of inventories and costs are
made for each MOS previously mentioned. There are several
data bases contained in the program. The dati bases are
based on 1983 figures and include enlisted pay tables,
continuation rates and promotion rates by length-of-service
(LOS) and pay grade, and training and testing costs.
User-friendly routines facilitate the entry of specific
variables, and nine program-defined function kef s allow the
operator a wide variety of data manipulation. The program
is currently stored on two floppy disks that are used in
conjunction with an IBM Personal Computer.
The main pretext of PBMS is that its implementation
would lead, in the long term, to an increase in manning in
most military occupational specialties if all other parame-
ters remained constant (accessions in particular). To
39
compare this to the current EPMS force, the PBMS model must
be scaled down so that PBMS costs can be compared to EPMS
costs on a per capita (per person) basis- This scaling
factor is the ratio of PBMS annual accessions to EPMS annual
accessions where both would result in the same size force-
As an example, suppose the ratio of a PBMS force to the EPMS
force is 1.10 (ten percent higher) . This meai s that PBMS
would cost more than the EPMS system for that particular
military occupational specialty.
Suppose that the user wishes to compare ;osts for an
equally manned PBMS force versus an EPMS force. If the
ratio was 1.10, then one would actually need to use the
inverse of this figure, or 0-91, to compare costs (this
adjustment is used to make the two forces the same size).
When using the computer program's REPORT function to make
such comparisons using the model, these ratios will be given
to the user.
Another item of information that is generated by the
REPORT function is a breakdown of annual costs. Costs are
displayed (in millions of dollars) and are bised on the
accession ratio that the user has selected- The costs are
broken down into FULL ANNUAL COST, RETIREMENT COST, TRAINING
COST, BASE PAY, and PROFICIENCY PAY. Thess costs are
displayed for EPMS and PBMS; a column listing RESULTANT
SAVINGS (or lack thereof) is given, and PERCENTAGE OF
SAVINGS is also listed.
The key display on the REPORT display is the display
of the projected PBMS force- Manning is givei by LEADER
LEVEL {LL) aud COMPETENCY LEVEL (CL) . LEADER LEVELS (the
vertical component) range from LLO to LL5- Tie following
figure shows the relation between paygrade and leader level:
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Figure 3.2 Paygrade/Leader Level Relationship.
The model also designates COMPETENCY LEVEL (CL) which corre-
sponds to the horizontal (technical) componeo t of PBMS.
Each leader level can have up to five competency levels, but
this is not always the case and an MOS can havs as few as
only one competency level for a particular leader level.
The following figure demonstrates corresponding pay for
competency levels as they are presently authorized:
TABLE II
Proficiency Pay vs. Competency Level
SCOMP BASE PAY + $50 $100 $150 $200
LL X CL CL 1 CL 2 CL 3 CL 4
LL X+1 CL CL 1 CL 2 CL 3 CL 4
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The display on the screen will reflect the structure of the
MOS for leader levels and number of competency levels for
each leader level. Alongside/ in two columns, :an be found
the percentage of manning with relation to authorized
billets.
The last piece of information found fron the REPORT
display is GOODNESS OF FIT. The LL/CL goodness of fit
measure demonstrates how well resultant PBMS nanning fits
the allowed authorizations. The fit is better and therefore
more desirable as the goodness of fit figure approaches
zero.
This concludes the groundwork needed t3 understand
the PBCAM model display. The next section will describe
each of the programmed functions in a little nore detail.
Appendices F, G, and H may be used as a reference for the
appearance of the various displays.
3. Operation of the PBCAM Model
Complete operating instructions can be found in the
PBCAM booklet published by The Assessment Group. It
describes some of the general options available to the oper-
ator. The beauty of the PBCAM model lies in the fact that
the operator is able to revise policy parameters and then
run the iiodel to see exactly how the decisions will affect
cost and manning level. Although transitional information
is not yet available, the steady state information is very
valuable and gives the long run results of the operator's
policy change considerations.
a. CHGMOS
The Function One key (F1) is used to change the
military occupational specialty (MOS) that the model will




The Function Two key (F2) is usel to modify
certain parameters. Activating MODIFY will dispLay the PEMS
specifications for one leader level. Refer to Appendix F
during this discussion.
The heading will include the numbec of compe-
tency levels in the particular leader level and a column
representing each competency level. The Enlisted Paygrade
Q £o i) and Proficiency Pay, Level (0 to 3) together deter-
mine compensation for this 11/CL.
The two YOS rows specify the minimi m years of
service or maximum years of service to be eligible for this
particular LL/CL. Adjusting the maximum YOS will result in
the up-or-out policy the operator wishes to designate.
The next row, Percent flow from P_revious CL ,
displays the career progression from one competency level to
the next, both in terms of YOS and by proportion of those
who are advanced (percent flow) . By adjusting this quan-
tity, it would be possible to eventually arrivs at author-
ized levels of inventory.
The Number of lateral entries is a i ice feature
because it allows for the possibility of entrints to the
service from the civil sector (or other services). The
model assumes that training costs have already baen paid for
lateral entrants, but future modification will be necessary
to include basic training costs.
Entry cost (train ing/testing) and Day_s spent
(training/test ing) together specify the training costs
required for entry into the competency level, i hich varies
for each MOS.
List YOS for promotion to next LL sets a deci-
sion point that prevents the model from chargia g a service
member a second time for the same required school also
43
needed for a higher leader level. This also corresponds to
a Career Decision Point, where a soldier must choose between
a technical career and a leadership track. This value is
specified by a particular YOS.
CL (0 to 4) promoted to in next L^ correlates
technical qualifications possessed by a service member to
the highest CL he wculd be eligible for in the next lower
level.
Authorizations to measure against Is an input
for the policymaker's estimate of manpower to neet FY 1987
authorizations, affecting goodness of fit.
Finally, the EPMS Training, Cost Sun_mar_2 demon-
strates a breakdown of dollar cost and days of training per
man for specific training.
To use the MODIFY function, first pr3ss the (F2)
key. The LEADER LEVEL field will blink, and at this point
the user wculd select the desired LL. Next, tha same would
happen for COMPETENCY LEVEL. Following this, the cursor can
be moved to modify any desired field.
c. TRAIN
The Function Three (F3) key is usel to display
the EPMS TRAINing scheme. The information displayed pres-
ents, by skill level, the type of course, long term average
course costs (minus student pay and allowancesi , and the
course length. The user has all pertinent training informa-




The Function Four (F4) key is usel to DRAW a
career path diagram for a specific MOS (like tha diagram in
Appendix G) . Leader levels progress vertically, and YOS/CL
progress horizontally. This function may also be used after
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modifying the program in order to see how poLicy changes
would affect the structure.
e. REPORT
The Function Five (F5) key is the REPORT key,
which calculates the projected inventories and costs for the
proposed MOS. This display is the most important display
that the model uses and offers the operator the most infor-
mation. The MOS being analyzed is given at the top.
Inventory comparisons are made for different categories of
the force. These categories are:
a) Those with 4 years of service (YOS) and abova
b) Top 6 paygrades (E-4 to E-9)
c) Top 5 paygrades (E-5 to E-9)
d) Total force
Numbers and ratios are supplied to the user with accession
ratios for cost comparison. The left side of the display
exhibits the leadership and competency level structure for
the particular MOS, as well as the PBMS inventory and EPMS
authorizations. A percentage column shows how well the
manning is achieved under PBMS, and a summary measure of fit
gives the overall manning fit. Refer to Appendix H.
f. PRINT
The Function Six (F6) key is used tD select the
PRINT option. This option is only available froa the REPORT
screen, and it provides a hard copy for the operator.
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g. SAVE
The Function Seven (F7) key is usel to select
the SAVE option. Striking SAVE allows the user to save a
specific set of specifications and parameters on his disk
under the program name of his choice.
h. FETCH
The Function Eight (F8) key is used to retrieve
or FETCH a previously saved data set.
i. QUIT
The Function Nine (F9) key is used to save the
INPUTSET specifications data and return to systen level.
At any point, the user may DRAW, FETCH, SAVE, or
QUIT. After MODIFYing and requesting a REPORT, calculations
may take up to two minutes. These are only basic instruc-
tions for ths model, and more detailed instn ctions are
available in the PBCAM booklet. The following chapter will
continue with a discussion of implementation prospects for
the U.S. Navy.
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IV. PBMS APPLIED TO THE 0. S. NAVY
A. COBRENT INADEQUACIES
Managers often are amazed to find out that tie solutions
to very complicated problems are masked in simplicity. In
the Look In Search of Excellence, the common ingredient of
all of the "excellent" companies surveyed was taeir ability
to do well on the "basics" [ Eef . 11]- All of the common
"motherhoods" of management science are well kno*n, but they
are not always followed. This thesis will not really
present any "new ideas" that have not been discussed else-
where in the management community, and yet the thorough and
proper iiplementation of old, basic ideas could very well
revolutionize the DoD personnel management system.
A recent article in the Navy Times of May 7, 1984 made
front page headlines. "Better Force Planning f :> r Enlisteds
Proposed" was the title, and the following quotation from
the article is of interest:
"WASHINGTON Pentagon officials plan to rs vise the
enlisted personnel management system next year in a wa
that could smooth career paths for members and cur!
y
rb
on-again, off -again promotion and bonus opportunities
that make career planning difficult.... Defense
Department and service officials plan to revise the
enlisted management system by requiring the services
each year to provide specific projections ani enlisted
manpower requirements—by paygrade, years of service and
occupational field— for up to five years into the
future. They would also have to develop Individual
service plans to achieve the objectives. While improved
career planning for members would be a side benefit of
the system change, officials said the proposal responds
to mounting criticism from Congress that the services
lack understandable, long-range forecasts of enlisted
requirements, making it difficult for Congress to
monitor the adequacy of annual grade and bonus money
requests." [Eef. 12]
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The very end of the article gave one Government
Accounticg Officers view of the proposed management
changes.
"..-.'The concept has been around a Id ng time.
Conceptually, it's been on the street since 1972.
However, it was never really enforced or used or fully
developed as a management tool. ... although soma services
did much better than others. The idea is to have a
stable career force and smooth the growth over time and
look at the long term consequences.
'
....'It's a process to (help them achieve) what they
say they need. The half that's missing is, "U hat is it
that they really need?" That part supposedly is what
they are working on, but it has not surfaced.' "
[Ref. 12]
Again, the idea of the "basics" not being adequately
performed still appears to be a problem- Although the
concept discussed in the article, "objective force", is a
step in the eight direction, the tie between c eguirements
and performance of those requirements still needs to be
strengthened to really justify any compensation policy. The
objective force (five year manpower requirements by grade
and years of service) is an important stepping stone to PBMS
and is wholly supported by this author.
In reading this article, as well as what is apparent
from other sources, the present manpower managament system
is still capable of further refinement, and the performance
based management idea is a very likely candidat3 for review
and possible implementation.
Generally speaking, the Army has been predominantly
concerned with behav ioral competence (leadership ability in
the field), as opposed to the Navy, which has been much more
concerned with technical competence (skill requirements
relating to systems) . It is interesting to not3 , however,
that the Army was the first service to conceive of PBMS as a
solution to its current problems, even though its advantages
are more fully realized in a technical system such as the
Navy ' s.
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1 . Advantages/Disadvantages of Navy PBMS
The first chapter of the thesis contains d a general
list of advantages and disadvantages to be gained from
servicewide PBMS implementation. A more refined list may
now be appropriately constructed that looks strictly at U.S.
Navy PBMS implementation.
Eefore constructing this specific list o: advantages
and disadvantages, one point should be made concerning
objectives. Each particular system that is implemented in
the DoD is designed to attain certain objectives, especially
when relating to compensation. The system oc enlistment
bonuses was originated to attract recruits and increase
accessions. The current Navy Selective Reenlis tment Bonus
(SRB) system is used to fill shortages. Although some may
claim that the SRB is used to improve performaa ce of indi-
viduals in the fleet, its basic function is still to fill
billets, and any increase in the performance oc competency
of the individual is merely a by-product (in this case,
desirable) of the system. We are only rewarding those indi-
viduals who fulfill the SRB eligibility requira ments, and
sometimes this reward is given to people with questionable
performance. A pe rfor mance based nianagement system will
bridge the gap by rewarding what we actually want to reward,
and that is performance.
With this main objective in mind, one ; an begin to
analyze the requirements and nature of naval forces and
determine some of the obvious advantages and disadvantages
of a PBMS system.
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2 • Ady ant ages
a. Hi-tech Navy
A system like PBMS potentially realizes its
highest savings and benefit when used in an organization
that is highly technical and reguires significant personnel
training. The success or failure of most operational U.S.
Navy afloat units is directly dependent upon the proficiency
of the operators and maintainers of various sophisticated
systems. There is considerable competition for quality
high-school graduates with the potential for technical
education, and PBMS could more effectively utilize this
scarce resource. Although no studies have effectively
linked increased technology to higher educational require-
ments in the service, the tend towards high technology
systems will most likely result in higher retirements in
some areas.
b. Mobile and Deployed Navy
This characteristic offers both advantages and
disadvantages. A high deployment rate results in a higher
opportunity to operate and maintain important systems.
Frequent training opportunities in a variety of scenarios
also offers frequent opportunity to measure proficiency.
Since unit performance is regularly evaluated at sea (such
as REFTRA or PEB)
,
specific individual performance also
seems a likely candidate for concurrent measuremant.
c. Older and Retention-oriented Force
Some navy studies have linked higher produc-
tivity with an older, more experienced force [Ref. 13].
Navy units do have certain requirements for physical
stamina, but a slightly older force would cause virtually no
system degradation due to lack of physical ability (other
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services have higher dependence on physical abilL ty) . PBHS
is also in harmony with the present Navy-wide goal of
increased retention [Ref. 14]-
d. Technical Billets at Sea
Although not intended to be an incentive program
for sea duty, this would be a desirable by-proiuct of PBMS
due to the preponderance of technical billets being at sea.
If PBMS rewards those in technical billets only, competition
for sea-duty billets may increase, and the competition for a
few technical shore billets could significantly enhance the
quality of instructors and training.
e. Quantifiable Performance
All services have had problems to sone degree in
trying to simulate wartime conditions, but in most cases
naval systems performance can be observed, testel , and quan-
tified during peacetime conditions. Proficiency of opera-
tors and maintainers can be measured, resulting in higher
readiness for a "come-as-you-are" war.
3 • Disadvantages
a. Mobile and Deployed Navy
Opportunities for classroom training and testing
are severely limited for deployed units. Proficiency
testing opportunities for PBMS may also be limited if they
require the use of special facilities and trainers, and the
scheduling of personnel to be tested for proficiency may
become an administrative burden.
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t. Sea/Shore Rotation
For the most efficient utilization )f high-tech
personnel, reward would most likely go to only those in
specified technical billets that have met certification
requirements. This could result in dissatisfaction of fleet
personnel taking a "pay-cut" when going to shore duty (this
perception is already held in relation to the sea-pay
program) . In an efficient system, highly-trained personnel
should tie highly utilized. Due to the number of combat-
associated technical billets, it would be more cost effi-
cient to train males than females, and this ia turn could
result in less training for female sailors. This lack of
training opportunity would be perceived as unfair and
sexually biased.
c. Highly-Tailored System
The large amount of variety in systems, plat-
forms, and NEC's (Navy Enlisted Classification Codes)
present a major obstacle in devising a fair system to estab-
lish performance requirements and testing. Tests would be
most likely need to be tailor-made for individuals with
specific training on certain equipment.
d. Costly Testing System
Administering the complex perfornance tests
(both hands-on and written) will take significant time and
energy, as well as being more costly. Developing tests and
standards is a major hurdle to overcome, and keeping the




Adequate models that determine the in pact of the
loss of key personnel in a weapons system (such as AMORE)
have not yet reached adequate sophistication, and outcomes
are still questionable. An older experienced force could
conceivably result in over- dependence on technical personnel
and not enough younger inexperienced personnel to perform
necessary combat functions (such as messengers, phone-
talkers, watchstanders, fire party personnel, etc.).
f. Force Structure
The ultimate objective is obtaining the proper
manpower mix needed by the Navy. PBMS may not be able to
supply the proper force structure without significant exper-
imentation and revision.
These are only a few of the issues iavolved with
PBMS implementation in the U.S. Navy, and undojbtedly many
more will surface. The next section will continue assessing
Navy requirements.
B. REQUIREMENTS OF A HAVY PBMS SYSTEM
In examining the feasibility of performance based
management in the Navy, it would be worthwhile to examine
some of the ground rules and restrictions, as well as other
limiting considerations that must be taken into account,
that are unique to the Navy.
1 • Ground R ules and Re strict ions
The first basic areas of interest to Id ok at when
considering PBMS implementation are those areas that are
relatively fixed and unchangeable. There are certain
restrictions that must be adhered to by the present as well
53
as any proposed systems. The following list of restrictions
are only a few of the more important ones.
a. Legal Restrictions
Various parts of the U.S. Constitution, titles
of the U.S. Code, and other public laws specify the purpose,
structure, and operating procedures to be followed by the
Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy. The PBMS system,
if implemented, would only change a few laws and would have
a relatively minor impact (these laws would reflect changes
in dollar amounts for compensation and other PBMS proce-
dures). There are many laws that PBMS would not directly
change, but these laws would exert a significant influence
on the PBMS system (i.e., the role of women in combat
forces) . Legal implications would require thorough review
by the Judge Advocate General Corps.
b. Combat vs. Support Units
Current naval forces are presently a mix of
deployed combat units and non-combat support units.
Policymakers will need to consider how training dollars and
technical billets will be allocated to each sector, given
that the make-up of the force remains constant.
c. Sea/Shore Rotation
As mentioned previously, will a saiL or going to
a non-technical billet be forced to take a cut in pay? How
much of a cut will take place for those in technical ratings
that accept general duty billets? There are also units that
are not regularly deployed and only utilize high-tech
ratings for short periods of time. Being that sea/shore
rotation is a "given" parameter of the equation, it will
need to be specifically dealt with.
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d. Policy Changes
A critical component of PBMS is the ability to
change the size and structure of the force through changes
in policy. As demonstrated by current proposed changes in
the tctal compensation package, too many proposed policy
changes are perceived by the fleet as a breach of implied
contract, resulting in dissatisfaction and instability
[Ref. 15]- To ensure stability, PBMS should designate what
areas are subject to change (pay rates, time to promotion,
etc.) and what parts of the system will remain static. The
job of the command career counselor may become overwhelming
when trying to give advice on such a complex system.
e. Rate Structure
The area of military custom and tradition must
not be too severely tampered with. Some proponents of Army
PBMS are considering special insignia that identifies the
wearer as a leader or as a technician. Would this be appro-
priate for the Navy? Currently, privileges and benefits are
dependent upon one' s paygrade. There could be resentment
when an E-4 technician with fifteen years of service and a
large family is not given an adequate household goods weight
allowance or is denied access to certain petty-officers'
clubs. The present force may be unwilling to accomodate too
many sweeping changes to already-established no n- pecuniary
benefits and "perks" commensurate with paygrade.
These are only a few examples of the fixed
parameters that any management system is subject to in the
Navy. There are other considerations and questions that are
relatively unique to the Navy which planners must take into




a. Reward Tied to Billet
To achieve better utilization of hij hly trained
personnel, should proficiency pay only be paid to those
serving in high-tech billets? Could it also be paid
according to the highest competency level that a sailor has
attained regardless of the billet being occupied? Perhaps
the latter is a better solution, because when the time comes
for him to occupy a technical billet, he will already be
proficient and ready to fill it. This is similar to the
argument supporting Aviation Career Incentive Pay, and
although it may be somewhat costlier, it may lave similar
advantages.
b. Male and Female Sailors
Would female sailors be presented with an equal
opportunity for training and proficiency pay, or would needs
of the service make this unlikely? Again, a consideration
that must be dealt with.
c. Specificity
The current Navy training and testing system
already faces the problem of how specific it should be when
testing sailors. Most sailors in a specific rating must be
familiar with a a variety of equipment, including some gear
that they have never seen before. The Army has a similar
problem with tank crews (a fully qualified M-60 tank gunner
may be unqualified in an M- 1 tank) . Since the Navy trains
its personnel through a specific pipeline to operate
specific equipment, perhaps the solution would be to test
their proficiency only on the gear that they operate or
maintain. Tests would be tailor-made for inlividuals in
specific billets with specific NEC's by the use of a
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guestion bank. A computer at the Naval Edi cation and
Training Command (NETC) could verify what training courses
and what billets a particular sailor has familiarity with,
and then generate a test from appropriate guestion banks.
Each rating would still be responsible for general knowledge
of the rating, but sailors would be forced to be thoroughly
proficient in the billet that they are in.
d. Ingredients of Testing
There is no doubt that testing will be costly
and test security will be a problem, but for an individual
to maintain and be rewarded for a certain competency level,
tests must be given on a regular cycle (for example, every
12 or 18 months) . Some tests may be in a format other than
paper and pencil, and such as hands-on testing through simu-
lators or during actual fleet exercises. Reliability,
validity, and practicality will be the key ingredients of
the test program.
e. Integration with HARDMAN
Once the program has been adopted, the Navy
should insure that all of the contractors and other
personnel involved with the acguisition of new systems and
hardware be familiar with the PBMS system. They should also
ensure that all new systems be specific in stating the
manpower reguireraents in terms of leader level and compe-
tency level. Quality requirements and effect oa the compo-
sition of the force are prime considerations of the weapons
acguisition process.
f. Flexibility
As the U.S. Army pilot program de/elops, the
Navy must be sure to task a cognizant activity with the
responsibility of closely monitoring the Army's program. As
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certain pitfalls an<3 traps are encountered, the Navy can
benefit fcy changing its program so that it will cot dupli-
cate the Army's mistakes.
g. Evaluation of the Pilot Program
The key ingredient in determining whether PEMS
will actually work is a thorough evaluation of a pilot
program. Data obtained from this pilot program will help
uncover all the attitudes of the test group as well as give
a closer approximation of the actual costs involved.
Testing and evaluation of the pilot program must te given
high priority and attention.
C- RECOMMENDATIONS FCB PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
1 • Hes ult s of Researc h
The intent of this thesis was to examine the current
development of performance based management and try to
determine whether such a program would be feasible for the
Navy. From the onset of the project, this researcher was
aware of the possibility that hard and concrete numbers
might not be available to affirm or deny the feasibility of
such a program in the Navy. The information and data that
was required to perform an accurate study was not available
in the proper form to this researcher {particularly with
respect to promotion rates and school costs)
.
This
researcher would, however, like to prescribe a format
(recipe) that could be utilized by others to attain the
proper data and adequately analyze PBMS for use by the Navy.
There were several problems in trying to perform a
guantitative analysis of the PBCAM model using Navy data.
Most of the problems concerned the acquisition of appro-
priate data sets.
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There are three important (but elusive) data sets
that must be obtained for proper PBCAH operation. The first
data set/ continuation rate by length of service (LOS) and
paygrade, is regularly published by the Navy Manpower and
Personnel Command (NMPC) and is available upon request for
each particular Navy rating. The data must still be
converted to a computer-usable format for PBCAM. The resul-
tant data set should be in seven columns (E1-E3, E4,-..E9)
and thirty rows per column (YOS 1-30). Each sntry repre-
sents a continuation rate for those in each respective cell.
The second data set needed for PBCAM operation was
promotion rate by 1CS and paygrade for each respective
rating. Promotion data was not found by this researcher and
normally must be constructed from continuation, accession,
and other data. Continuation gives a probability of the
service member being in the service the following year,
which is relatively easy to determine by computer.
Promotion rats, the probability of a service member being
promoted to the next higher paygrade for each cell, is more
difficult to find and requires more sophisticated data
manipulation. Although this researcher requested the infor-
mation specifically from two different sources (OP-135 and
DMDC) neither source was able to supply these pr3 motion rate
tables. Promotion rate tables are in the same exact format
as continuation rates, and are absolutely necessary for the
model to forecast manning levels (the use of promotion rates
may not be the best way to forecast, and later enhanced
models may possibly use labor supply elasticities).
A third data set that was difficult to obtain was
that of training costs. There are many differences in
methods that allocate costs to each student. Research is
currently being done by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
that demonstrates different average costs for training
students having different mental categories [Ref- 16].
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Comparison of CNA data and NETC data for the si me year did
not often match, due to assumptions that had been made for
the allocation of costs. CNETNOTE 1514 contains Navy
Enlisted Skill Eating Pipelines and associated costs. The
present reference work concerning cost information for Navy
schools is the Navy Comprehensive Compensation and Supply
Study (NACCS) [Eef. 17]. It is recommended that future
research that concerns costing use the system prs scribed and
established in this study for consistency. In preparing
costs for PBCAM, CNET data must be adjusted because it
includes base pay for the duration of the school, resulting
in double-counting.
These three data bases need to be enters d for PBCAM
to run. The present format of the data in the PBCAM program
precluded this researcher from entering Navy data, as it was
imbedded in the program. Future enhanced PBCAM models
should allow for easier entry of cost and cd ntinuaticn/
promotion data. Other data sets, such as current pay
tables, are relatively straightforward.
2 « Application of PBCAM Model
This section hopes to be an aid to furtier research
concerning PBMS application to the Navy. Although this
thesis has concentrated on subjective and qualitative
issues, further research will hopefully yield sDlid quanti-
tative results.
The Navy PBCAM model should include ratings from
subsurface, surface, and aviation communities. Technical
(with a few non-technical) ratings should be chosen, and
shore-based support ratings should also be represented.
Cost data on training pipelines as well as continuation rate
data are also prerequisites for choosing a particular
rating. This researcher chose Avionics Technician (AT),
Electronic Warfare Technician (EW), and Yeoman (YN)
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originally because costing data was known to exist. The
Army model contained five general MOS areas (including
combat, combat support, and combat service support groups)
and plans for model enhancement include the addition of
other specialty areas (other tank personnel and linguists).
Once the ratings are chosen, the data sets for
continuation rates, promotion rates, and pipeline training
costs must ba gathered and put into the proper format for
data entry. Continuation rates are availabLe from the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) by comparing the
Enlisted Master File from one year to the next. The algo-
rithm for creating the table of promotion rates ;an be found
in the PBCAM manual [Ref. 2]. As mentioned previously, by
using promotion rates instead of labor supply elasticity,
one is relying on the assumption that service members are
responding cnly to the pay tables (nonpecuniary compensation
such as rank, priveleges, etc. are ignored). Future models
(and the pilot program) should take into account estimates
of the nonpecuniary income elasticity of labor supply.
Additionally, the data set that contains pay tables should
be entered using current information, as this information
usually changes annually.
Finding and identifying pipeline trainiig costs is
also a key issue. Costs should not reflect the student's
pay and allowances while attending school because they are
included elsewhere in the model. Assumptions made in the
NCCSS should be followed for the sake of consistency.
The Navy should also attempt to interface the PBCAM
model with a model such as AMORE. Navy systems and there-
fore unit readiness are significantly affected by the loss
of technical personnel and resulting system degradation, so
these impacts should be thoroughly explored with a model
prior to implementation.
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The next step in program i mpleraentatiD n would be
tasking from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to the
program sponsor. The sponsor would then task other specific
areas, set up meetings, and construct a plan of attack and
milestones. Advice from the Army would be extremely helpful
in this area, because the commands that the Army used in
developing F3MS have similar counterparts in the Navy.
Job analysis would be a very large an! important
part of PBHS implementation. Existing information (such as
NOTAP/NODAC, Navy manpower planning data, etc.) would need
to be combined, carefully analyzed, reported, and entered
into a data file to help identify the exact performance that
is required for each individual unit. Those people that
would be establishing manpower requirements would have to
avoid ra ting inflation, which would be the overstating of
actual requirements (asking for an E-5 where an E-4 would be
suitable) . The fine tuning of the system may eventually put
more pressure on detailers to fill exact requirements
instead of having the lattitude of one paygrade as they
presently hava. Job analysis will yield not only paygrade
but also competency level, and detailers may eventually have
only one competency level of lattitude when assigning tech-
nicians. Establishing what actually constitutes adequate
proficiency for competency levels and pay grades is a giant
task, but it is a necessary task for strean lining the
manpower assignment/compensation process.
The training commands throughout the coua try will be
particularly busy trying to develop rating examinations that
are broken dowr. into various competency levels. Much
testing and validation will need to be performed to ensure
that the tests are adequate. As the capability of the
Navy's information and computer systems increases, these
seemingly impossible tasks will become more manageable.
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The Navy manpower analysts and policymakers will be
busy trying to determine what policies will yield the most
desirable force. They will need to establish a clear-cut
formula for advancement that will include propsr weighting
for test score, performance evaluation, and recommendations.
A point worksheet may very well be the end result. It will
be up to the policy, analysis, and planning personnel to
provide a forre with no overcrowded rates, no shortages of
critical skills, and a force that is planned five or ten
years in advance tc provide enough lead time as weapon
system requirements change.
Most of this planning will be directed towards a
pilot program similar to the one envisioned by the Army.
Once all of the planning and analyses are completed, a pilot
program of sufficient size can be implemented. Participants
of the program will be protected in a manner similar to the
Army's system so that their careers and compensation will
not be adversely affected if the concept is not approved.
The Human Resources Management System will closely follow
the participants to examine their concerns and perceptions.
Information from the validation of the pilot program will
help to enhance accuracy of the model and resultant
predictions. If the pilot program is successful, additional
ratings may then be added to the program, providing in the
long term a mild transition to PBMS with little shock.
3. Sum mar y
The above description is presented as a very ideal
and orderly implementation (and research) of the perform-
ance based management system. This particular scenario may
not actually occur, and the program as it is now envisioned
may be completely different from a future variant. It is
important to realize, however, that PBMS is becoming a
reality for the Army, and that now is the appropriate time
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to conduct the research for the PBMS program in the event
that the Navy is directed to make PBMS a reality also.
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V. FUTURE PEHS: PROBLEMS, MODIFICATIONS, AND REC3 MMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Thus far, the concept of performance base! management
has been explained, analyzed, and considered for application
to the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. The idea of applying
performance based management and performance bas2 d compensa-
tion is still in its infancy and will have to endure many
growing pains until it matures as a viaole system.
Historically, the rewarding of critical billets with higher
compensation was done in the Army in the 1800's and highest
benefits were paid to those in technical special: ies such as
ordnance. There is little disagreement in rewarding tech-
nical performance (especially when looking from an econo-
mist's viewpoint), and there is also little argument against
rewarding those in leadership positions that have greater
responsibility. Accomodating these two dimensions into one
system has been difficult, and the contention by many
managers is that the present system has not yet thoroughly
solved this problem as of yet.
This paper has discussed some of the issues involved in
constructing a system that will more suitably combine these
two dimensions. Thus far, only the basic system that is
currently being proposed has been analyzed for two different
services. This chapter will take the program a step further
by posing a few more questions and then outlining some
potential modifications for the system. Recommendations
that will help to fix some of the more seriois potential
problems will be discussed, and the final chapter
(Conclusions) will provide the reader with a broad overview
of the military application of performance based management.
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B- PEOBLEMS FOR EESCIOTION
Throughout the thesis, disadvantages as they apply to
the entire military as well as Navy implementation have been
discussed. At the risk of being redundant, this researcher
would like to address some of the problems that may not have
been thoroughly covered earlier.
There are two major problems that must be solved in
order for performance based management to be successful.
First, the establ ishment of realistic reguir ements and
second, establishment of realistic £erformance standards and
their measurement. These two problems must be adequately
solved for the system to work.
The first problem (establishment of requirements) has
actually been under analysis since the beginning of our
armed forces. This same step, however, now requires a
significantly increased degree of detail and sophistication.
Throughout the programming and budgeting process, Congress
has continued to ask DoD the question, "What do you need in
the way of manpower requirements to operate?" Congress is
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the answer to that
question every year, and the sooner the services have a
capability to give a detailed report containing exact and
justifiable leadership and technical requirements to DoD,
the sooner they will get the authorization and funding for
the required manpower.
Once the requirements have been established, they should
not be tampered with for the sake of convenience or polit-
ical motivation. The requirements would need to be reviewed
on a regular cycle due to technological change over time,
but the services would lose all credibility if they were to
tamper with and change the stated requirements in order to
satisfy other objectives. The requirements must be truly
representative and not overstated for the same reason.
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Congressional experts will quickly see through re guests that
have been inflated so that the services are asking for more
quality and numbers of personnel than they really need.
The second problem (establishing realistic performance
standards and measuring them) is most formidible.
Throughout history, the inability to realistically assess
performance has plagued the services. Even so, although it
is formidible it is not impossible. The services have the
machinery in place to adequately analyze each rating and to
establish basic levels of leadership and technical compe-
tence. By using a cross section of techniques (such as
delphi) and a cross section of analysis (operational unit,
private contractor, and research facility analysis), a two-
dimensional structure with leadership and technical levels
can be reasonably constructed. This same structure will
drive the establishment of the system used for evaluation
and measurement. Commands responsible for training and
testing can work with operational units (as well as private
contractors) to determine how the desired performance can
best be tested. Although this process may sound costly, it
seems apparent that significant savings will ultimately be
gained by rewarding the exact desired performance of indi-
viduals instead of throwing money at selected groups of
people hoping that a percentage of the group that is worthy
will be rewarded. The establishment of realistic perform-
ance standards and testing them by MOS/rating is a chi e vable
as well as desirable.
Another problem that is significant is trying to modify
policy in order to optimize the size and cost of the force.
Attaining the exact numbers of people in each respective
cell will not be possible, but reasonable adjustment of
career decision point gates and recruiting could yield a
force that would approach optimality. Chasing the desired
quantity numbers erratically by adjusting policy without
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concern for quality implications must be avoided. People in
the system deserve a certain amount of system stability, and
if inconsistencies between year groups become too large,
morale and retention will ultimately suffer.
The type of force that results from PB1 S will be
different from today's force, which may require adjustments
in thinking. The force will be older, more career oriented,
with a higher proportion of dependents. By increasing the
dependence upon key technicians that operate and maintain
vital systems, a heavier reliance is being placed on each
individual. When a key system technician becomes a battle
casualty, ths ensuing loss of the entire system could have
serious implications for unit survivability. This lack of
redundancy will be analyzed when the model is interfaced
with AMOEE.
The content of the force will still be unds r the same
deployed/CONUS assignment, sea/shore rotation, and male/
female manning policy restrictions as the current system,
and these issues must also be grappled with as previously
mentioned.
C. POTENTIAL MODIFICATIONS OF PBMS
1 . Planned Modifications
The performance based management system is already
slated for some existing model enhancement, and the list of
possible improvements is growing. The PBCAM, i hich is now
refered to as the Economic; Analysis Model, will be improved
to include some new and better features. The data base will
be updated, better reflecting current trends. The inclusion
of a transition model to determine short term as well as
long term results will be a welcome addition. Tie inclusion
of bonus factors and their affects will help provide infor-
mation on costs and elasticities. An accurate breakdown of
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retirement costs will add to the reliability of predictions,
and the inclusion of all specialties/ratings will broaden
the analysis. Adding information concerning reserve and
guard forces will give a better picture of the total force,
and improved software will result in the easier input of
data sets and will result in the model being more user
friendly. The model will also be in concert with the
recently announced objective force concept.
2. New Modi fi cations for Consideration
This researcher would like to propose some of the
following ideas to be considered as future modifications of
PBMS:
a. Officer FEMS
The same characteristics, advantages, and disad-
vantages of enlisted PBMS would also be found in an officer
system. The services presently use various methods to allow
officers to specialize in a technical skill area instead of
a predominantly leadership area (although thay are still
combined to a certain degree). The warrant officer grades
and special corps' such as the Navy's Dental Corps are tech-
nically oriented. Perhaps other areas where high training
costs are involved (such as nuclear or aviation officers)
could be integrated into some sort of PBMS systen . Many of
the arguments are the same.
t. "Supertech"
The maximum number of authorized competency
levels is presently five (CLO through CL4) . On: e a techni-
cian has achieved the limit of his leadership capability but
wishes to continue his technical path (perhaps he is the
operator of a unique and complex x-ray machinei , he could
enter a competency level 5 (or some other name) where his
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pay would be dependent upon length of service. Perhaps a
seven percent annual pay raise would be adequate to keep him
from entering the private sector and would kee? him satis-
fied to perform the same job until he retired after thirty
years. This "supertech" would not require PCS moves, would
not be forced tc be a supervisor, and would be satisfied
with his job. He would remain adequately compensated as
long as he continued to meet proficiency requirements. This
is a key point, since continued competency (performance)
would be necessary and requirements for upgraded skills
could be adjusted to keep up with changing technology.
c. Payment
Thus far, the system has chosen pro-pay in fifty
dollar increments. Further analysis would be necessary to
determine more efficient and effective increments, although
there have been few successful attempts in quantitatively
determining how much the value of filling a certain require-
ment is worth. Additionally, the PBMS concept is not
restricted to the use of pro-pay only. The system could be
integrated with (and perhaps eventually eliminate the need
for) the selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) . Many taxpayers
find the idea of paying one lump sum of thousands of dollars
to a service aember for just reenlisting a quite distasteful
idea. The recipients of these bonuses are often not the top
performers. An alternative might consist of taking the same
SRB money and distributing it at specified intervals base d
05. performance. The first payment would be similar to the
first SRB lump sum but would be a smaller anount (6000
dollars in this example). Perhaps eighteen months later, he
would be awarded 2000 dollars to requalify (on either the
equipment he normally operates or for advancing to another
competency level)
.
Eighteen months later hs would be
awarded another 2000 dollars for training on a new system or
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achieving another competency level. This would i gain happen
eighteen months later. In this way, a 12,000 doLlar SRB has
been spaced out during the entire time span and is dependent
upon the service member's continuing progress. Dollar
amounts would have to be adjusted to the appropriate
discount rates, but the preceding example den onstrates a
possibility that might be more appealing to Congress.
d. Certification and Licensing
The use of this system is dependent j pon regular
certification, and in some respects is very similar to
receiving a license. In fact, there are some ratings where
commercial certification could result in advancement to the
next competency level. In PBMS, if a service member's
"license" expires or is revoked, the compensation for that
level would also be discontinued. PBMS can be likened to a
large certification program.
e. Selection Board Techniques
This particular recommendation is usad to illus-
trate that test scores may not be the only means of deter-
mining advancement to the nest competency level. Each
rating may have its own "best method" for determining and
measuring performance.
f. Integration with School Programs
The service often trains and actual, ly pre pare s
people for leaving the service for civilian employment
opportunities. A better method needs to be ieveloped to
link school with service. The Veteran's Education
Assistance Program (VEAP) and its successors do not provide
much of a return to the services. The cycla should be
reversed so that the civil sector does the training and then
the services reap the reward. Could a service member be
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granted a two-year college program, and then return to
active duty and be compensated at the increased competency
level? PBHS might provide a starting point for educational
programs to be used as an incentive, low cost training, and
returned benefits. Even the use of a two or four year
Delayed Entry Program (DEP) could be examined.
g. Quality of Entrants
The relationship of quality (as expressed by
mental category) to training has already been demonstrated
[Hef. 16]. There may also be other relationships that tie
quality to other personnel functions such as recruiting or
retention. The importance of the quality of the entrant
should be included in future PBCAM models, fDr it is a
parameter that significantly affects cost and force struc-
ture. Promotion rates are tied to mental category. Higher
quality recruits take less time to train. It could conceiv-
ably be cheaper in the long run to recruit by mental
category. Quality is an integral part of PBCAfl results and
should therefore be included.
h. Encouragement of Lateral Entry
Although the topic of lateral entry has arisen
many times in military manpower, the PBMS coicept would
enable the services to make this a ceality on a relatively
large scale. Because the detailed job analysis and require-
ments would be specific, there would be no question whether
a lateral entrant possessed the appropriate skills. After a
military indoctrination, the new service member could pursue
a well compensated technical career without needing to
develop leadership skills, and the services coi Id signifi-
cantly benefit from civilian-trained people filling critical
shortages.
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The preceding proposals are ideas that could be
analyzed and possibly incorporated into a performance based
management system. The next section contains some recommen-
dations that this researcher feels are critical to success.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING PBMS
Regardless of the timing or format of any future PBMS
system, the following ingredients are critical to its
success, and many of these same recommendations also apply
to the current Enlisted Personnel Management System.
Computer management and expanded data base management
systems are the only way to successfully managa this large
and complex force. In virtually every phase of military
human resource management, computers are already being used
and their use must continue to be expanded. Computers
should be used to match the service member to the job, to
keep records of training and proficiency status, to keep a
current account of costs invested in human capital, and be
used to record other important statistics of the individual.
This data base should then feed its data to tha next level
to calculate utilization rates of trained personnel, attri-
tion, rating-specific information, and other information to
be used ty managers that make policy. Defense Manpower Data
Center information and other data that is spread around the
world must be collected and be usable for analysis and deci-
sion making. The use of computers for test composition and
scoring also cannot be overstressed. Question banks
containing hundreds of questions for each specific leader/
competency level could be formulated to make tailor-made
tests. Computer simulation of battle problems for testing
some specific ratings could also be generated.
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While speaking of testing, the testing system must
continue to evolve. If the desired perf orrai nee for a
mechanic is to fix a specific component, then component
repair should be tested. Sonar operators need audio tests,
hull technicians should be tested on welding or practical
damage control, construction equipment operators should
grade a road, and so forth. A general test like the Army's
Skill Qualification Test (SQT) is a good idea, but it cannot
adequately discriminate ability on some specific skills.
General testing, written rating tests, and practical phys-
ical tests must be integrated to give valid results on the
desi red mea surement.
As previously mentioned, a proper evaluation of a pilot
program is critical. Outside contractors may best be able
to evaluate the program, establish criteria of success, and
utilize advanced methods of analysis. The only way to real-
istically forecast outcomes of a PBMS program is careful
evaluation and scrutiny of the pilot. More specific recom-
mendations can be found in reference 1.
An explanation to the manpower force that is detailed
yet simple is also critical. There is no point In confusing
the manpower management system more, although PBMS is a more
sophisticated and complex system. Human factors will be
critical in ultimate success or failure.
There are a few more key benefits to PBMS ta at have not
been mentioned yet and are worthy of mention. One of these
benefits is flexibility. This program can be implemented in
varying degrees. Only a few highly technical ri tings could
be made two-dimensional, or eighty percent or more of the
ratings could be included. Payment methods could range from
pro-pay only to incremental SRB payments. The transition
could be slow with enly minor changes being made, or the
implementation could be a major overhaul of the management
system.
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Another selling point is the agreement of PBMS with
current indicators. The Fifth 2uadrennial Review on
Military Compensation recommendations for loager career
lengths is in agreement with PBMS. Many of the Grace
Commission's (PPSSCC) recommendations coincide with the
objectives of PBMS, especially cost.
The ingredients found in the above-average civilian
companies have been listed in the recent book, In Search of
Excellence (reference 11). PBMS contains many of these
ingredients. It is action-oriented, caters tD_ the user/
customer (stresses performance), emphasizes personal a ccom -
plishment (certification) , is driven by. value (people are
rewarded for performance) , and fosters a competitive
climate.
A final point to be made about implementing PBMS is
timeliness. The military services are currently enjoying a
position of strength. For the most part, critical ratings
are not short, recruiting goals are being met, and funding
is limited but available. Once a manpower crisis occurs, it
will be too late to adequately plan and evaluate a solution.
The next crisis, if solved in a haphazard fashion, will
result in years of damage that would take time to heal.
Many leading indicators point to further evaluation and
possible implementation of performance based management in
the military services. The time to act is now.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Enlisted Personnel Management Systems In the armed
services do not adequately integrate two dimensions of
performance, leadership competence and technical competence,
into the current one dimensional system of management. Some
services have chosen to emphasize one particular dimension
at the expense of the other (Air Force emphasizing technical
and Army emphasizing leadership) , but there have been
overall indications that legislators are dissatisfied with
justification by the services of manpower requests, and that
the use of skilled technicians in leadership billets is
costly and a poor utilization of resources-
Present compensation methods are good for accession and
filling critical needs, but the present system does not
specifically reward the desired outcome; there is not enough
of a linkage between perf ormance and c ompe nsation. A
proposed Performance Based Management System has been devel-
oped by the U.S. Army, and a corresponding Econonic Analysis
Model has been created to demonstrate various force struc-
ture, composition, and costs resulting from the changing of
several basic parameters.
The highly-technical composition of the U.S. Navy makes
it a logical candidate for a system using performance based
management, and such a system could offer significant
rewards. The system is not without faults, however, and it
is not a panacea that would solve all problems, but rather a
series of trade-offs.
Although the Army is progressing with analysis and
intends to implement a pilot program, progress has been
somewhat sluggish and the future of PBMS is tenuous. At
this particular time of the military manpower cycle, the
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services are in a relatively strong position ind research
conducted now could be carefully and thoroughly evaluated.
The research indicates that significant potential gains
could be male utilizing a performance based management
system, and this researcher strongly endorses farther anal-
ysis and iirplementa tion of a pilot program by either the
Army or the Navy as soon as practical.
There are many unknown parameters that need t o be deter-
mined to fully evaluate the potential of a Navy PBMS system.
Some of these issues and questions include specific training
costs, labor supply and retention elasticities, the non-
pecuniary compensation of the service, sea/shore (or
deployed/non-deployed) requirements, reliable and valid
methods of measuring specific performance, anaL ysis on to
what degree external economic conditions affect the services
and certain policies, and perceptions held by those in the
service concerning rewards and opportunities. The answers
to these issues may never be fully answered, but as the
answers to these questions improve, so will our compensation
and maragement of personnel.
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AP PENDIX A
1 PBMS GOAL STATEMENT*
PBMS GOAL
D TO IMPROVE THE TECHNICAL AND LEADERSHIP
COMPETENCY OF THE ENLISTED FORCE.
THIS MEANS PROVIDING:
• A TWO-DIMENSIONAL SUCCESS SYSTEM
• THAT IS PERFORMANCE BASED
• THAT CAN BE CERTIFIED AND EVALUATED
• THAT ACCOMMODATES CHANGING SOLDIER SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS
DEMAND
• THAT PROVIDES COMPENSATION AND STATUS LINKED TO LEVEL OF
PERFORMANCE
• AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ARMY TRAINING 90 CONCEPT
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AP PENDIX B




• 19E (M60 ARMOR CREWMAN)
COMBAT SUPPORT
• 33S (ELECTRONIC WARFARE
SYSTEMS REPAIR)
• 35 K rL,M,P,R (AVIONICS REPAIR)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
• 66J & 68J (AIRCRAFT
INSPECTION/REPAIR)
• 91P (X-RAY SPECIALIST)
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APPENDIX C





a DECISION FOR BROADER EXECUTION
o PILOT PROGRAM RESULTS
O TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS FOR BROADER
IMPLEMENTATION BEGIN
o PILOT PROGRAMS BEGIN
o SELECTION/PRIORITY OF FOLLOW-ON CMF/MOS
aDCSPER/COR TRADOC DECISION IPR O/A 30 APR 84
o DETAILED STAFF ASSESSMENTS BEGIN
a DAfTRADOC IPR 24 SEP 83
ADCSPER APPROVES CONCEPT & PILOT PROGRAMS
*CDR TRADOC APPROVES CONCEPT & PILOT PROGRAMS
• DCSPER DEVELOPS NOTIONAL CONSTRUCT
TASKS TRADOC TO DEVELOP CONCEPT
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AP PENDIX D
•TYPICAL HOS CAEEEE PATH'
















' PEMS CURRENT FUNDING*
This appendix is supplied to give the reader a general idea
of the amount of funding that has been awarded thus far to
develop the concept and also future prospects for funding.
ALREADY FUNDED
FY 1984 $ 144,000
PROJECTED FUNDING
Travel money, test money, contracts, and validity testing
FY 1984 $ 560,000
FY 1985 $ 640,000
FY 1986 $ 610,000
FY 1987 $ 610,000
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APPENDIX Z
• PBCAM SAMPLE OUTPUT 2MODIFY 1
FORCE COMPETENCY MODEL analysing MOS 19E
Modifying Leader Level: 2
With 4 Competency Level3 ^CL)
Enlisted Paygrade (3 to 9)
Proficiency Pay Level (0 to 3)
Minimum YOS for CL (1 or more)
Maximum YOS for CL (30 or less)
Percent flow from previous CL
Number of lateral entries
Entry cost (training/testing)
Days spent (training/testing)
Last YOS for promotion to next LL
CL (0 to 4) promoted to in next LL
Authorizations to measure against
EPMS Training Cost Summary: MOSB I
Name Cost
Skill Level Basic 271S
SXill Level 1 AIT 7795
Skill Level 2 PNCOC 5397
Skill Level 3 BNCOC 5497
1 2 3
5 5 5 5
1 2 3
5 7 9 11
13 13 13 20
90 90 90
5397 300 400 soo
20
13 13 13 20
1 1 1
11 23 46 34






ICHGMOS 2M0DIFY 3TRAIN 4DRAW 5REP0RT 6PRIHT 7SAVE 8FETCH 9QUIT
Force Competency Model: 2MODIFY
AP PENDIX S
» PBCAM SAMPLE OOTPaT 4DHA» t





























1CHGHOS 2MODIFY 3TRAIN 4DRAW SREPORT 6PR1MT 7SAVE 9FETCH 9QUIT
Force Competency Model: 4DRAW
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APPENDIX 9
• PBCAM SAMPLE OUTPUT. .. 5REP0BT'
FORCE COMPETENCY MODEL analysing MOS 19E
HEN AUTH lage
US CL3 1 14 INVENTORY COMPARISOMS HITH EQUAL ACCESSIONS
1X5 CL2 1 1 86
TT<^ CXI 24 5 487 EPMS FORCE C Ratio Inverse
ixs CXO 2
i
s 32 4 or more YOS 161 177 1.099 0.910
1X4 CX3 5 7 68 Top 6 Paygrades P.27 242- 1.069 0.93S
1X4 CX2 11 10 109 Top 5 Paygrades 164 172 1.044 0.958
1X4 CXI 14 4 352 Total Force 341 3S7 1.046 0.956
1X4 CLO 3 3 93
1X3 CX4 1 16 7
1X3 CX3 3 20 13
1X3 CX2 3 27 30 ANNUAL COSTS ($M) FOR A C1.935 ACCESSION RATIO
LL3 CXI 20 14 144
1X3 CXO 11 7 IS6 EPMS FORCE C SAVINGS PERCENT
1X2 CX3 9 34 26 Full Annual Costa 7.18 6.84 0.34 4.67
1X2 CX2 7 : 46 IS Retirement Cost 0.20 0.20 0.01 3.36
1X2 CXI 15 23 63 Training Cost 0.90 0.47 0.32 40. S7
1X2 CXO 28 11 2S3 3ase pay «nd P»-opay 3.92 3.9S -0.03 -0.74
TT.1 CXI 9 58 16
1X1 CXO 57 58 98
IXO CXO 107 114 94 Summary Measure of Fit 0.255
ICHGMOS 2MODIFY 3TRAIN 4DRAH 5REP0RT 6PRINT 7SAVE 8FETCH 9QUIT
Force Competency Model: 5REPORT
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APPENDIX I
•SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PBCAM*
Summary and Recommendations
- Retirement Cost Estimates Must Be Improved
- Human Capital Model For Guidance In Timing
of Training, SRBs, Retirement Provisions
- Interface With AMORE
- Prepare Data Collection For Elasticity Work
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